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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brandon Torson appeals, asserting the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress because the officer impermissibly extended the duration of the stop without reasonable
suspicion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Taylor Aja was on patrol when he checked a car’s license plate number. (Tr., p.8,
Ls.4-9.) The car came back as having an expired registration, and Officer Aja initiated a traffic
stop.1 (Tr., p.8, Ls.9-12.) He did not articulate anything out of the ordinary with respect to the
car’s driving pattern. (See generally Tr.)
Officer Aja approached the driver, ultimately identified as Mr. Torson, and stood behind
his shoulder. (See State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja video), ~1:15.)2 Mr. Torson admitted both his license
and registration were not valid, and he also noted the insurance card he provided was expired.
(State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja video), ~1:22.) Officer Aja testified that Mr. Torson appeared more
nervous than expected for a traffic stop, and that Mr. Torson kept looking forward, rather than at
him. (Tr., p.9, L.21 - p.10, L.21; compare State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja video), ~1:203; see also
Tr., p.42, Ls.6-11 (defense counsel pointing out that Mr. Torson would have had to crane his
neck around to an uncomfortable degree to look directly at Officer Aja, based on where he was

1

On the video from Officer Aja’s body camera, the officer told the driver that the stop was also
based on a crack in the car’s windshield. (State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja video), ~1:22.) The officer did
not mention the crack during the suppression hearing. (See generally Tr.)
2
Exhibit 1 contains two video clips, one from Officer Aja and one from Officer Josh
Shackelford. To avoid confusion, citations thereto will identify the officer whose body camera
produced the clip.
3
Based on the camera’s positioning, Mr. Torson is not in the picture during part of the initial
encounter with Officer Aja. (See State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja video), ~1:20.)
1

standing).)

Officer Aja admitted he did not observe any other signs of intoxication, and

specifically noted he observed no sweating,4 no fidgety, furtive, or lethargic movements, no
rapid or slurred speech, no watery or bloodshot eyes, and no dilated or constricted pupils.
(Tr., p.18, L.17 - p.20, L.6.) Nor did Officer Aja smell any odor of alcoholic beverages or other
drugs in the car. (Tr., p.18, Ls.9-13.)
As Officer Aja went back to his car to process Mr. Torson’s information, he testified that
he saw Mr. Torson watching him in his rearview mirrors. (Tr., p.9, Ls.15-20.) Officer Aja
testified that, based on Mr. Torson’s apparent nervousness, he called for additional backup as
well as a drug dog.5 (Tr., p.11, Ls.8-11.) The drug dog eventually arrived and sniffed the car,
but it did not alert. (R., p.73.)
While Officer Aja was writing the citations,6 Officer Shackelford arrived on scene and
instructed Mr. Torson to get out of the car and sit on the curb. (Tr., p.11, L.21 - p.12, L.7;
Tr., p.27, Ls.18-24 (Officer Shackelford indicating he ordered Mr. Torson out of the vehicle at
Officer Aja’s direction).) Mr. Torson complied. (State’s Exhibit 1 (Shackelford video), ~0:05.)
Once Mr. Torson was out of the car, Officer Shackelford testified he could see that Mr. Torson’s
eyes were red and watery and had pinpoint pupils. (Tr., p.27, Ls.16-17) He asked Mr. Torson
for an explanation, and Mr. Torson responded his mother had just died, and that he was on
medications (specifically, antibiotics) as a result of a recent dental procedure. (State’s Exhibit 1

4

Officer Aja noted that, later on in the stop, he noticed Mr. Torson had begun to sweat, but not
during the initial encounter. (Tr., p.19, Ls.13-19.)
5
Officer Aja was already accompanied by a training officer when he initiated the stop. (See
Tr., p.7, Ls.7-19.)
6
The district court noted that, because Officer Aja was new to the Idaho police force, he needed
additional time to look up the relevant code sections while preparing the citations. (R., p.73 n.3.)
However, it also found that he did not delay in the preparation of those citations. (R., p.73, n.3.)
2

(Shackelford video), ~1:15.)

Officer Shackelford did not pursue the matter further.

(See

generally State’s Exhibit 1 (Shackelford video).)
Officer Aja testified he specifically took note of the fact that Officer Shackelford had
asked about Mr. Torson’s pupils “because I did not initially notice that.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-16.)
He did not mention taking notice of Officer Shackelford’s comment about Mr. Torson’s eyes
being red and watery. (See Tr., p.12, Ls.13-16; see generally Tr.) He also testified that he never
noticed that fact himself during the duration of the stop. (Tr., p.24, Ls.8-13.) Nevertheless, the
district court subsequently found that Officer Aja “overheard Officer Shackelford’s remark about
the red, watery eyes.” (R., p.73 & n.4.)
When Officer Aja finished writing the citations, he got back out of his car and walked
over to where Mr. Torson was still sitting on the curb. (State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja video), ~14:15.)
However, he admitted he did not serve those citations on Mr. Torson or return his documents at
that time. (Tr., p.23, Ls.9-16.) Rather, he admitted he began a DUI investigation. (Tr., p.23,
Ls.17-24.) He started by asking Mr. Torson about why his pupils were so constricted. (Tr., p.14,
Ls.8-16.) Mr. Torson clarified that one of the medications he was taking was Tramadol, which
Officer Aja knew to be a narcotic painkiller. (Tr., p.14, Ls.18-23.) Officer Aja also testified
that, during this conversation in the open air, he could smell a faint odor of an alcoholic beverage
from Mr. Torson. (Tr., p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.4.)
Mr. Torson asked whether he was being arrested, and Officer Aja explained that nothing
he had seen to that point indicated that Mr. Torson would be arrested. (State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja
video), ~15:20.) However, he explained Mr. Torson would not be allowed to drive the car away
because of his suspended license, though he said Mr. Torson could call someone to come and
pick up the car for him. (State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja video), ~15:25.) Nevertheless, Officer Aja told

3

Mr. Torson that he needed to complete field sobriety tests since he had been driving the car.
(State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja video), ~15:35; accord Tr., p.16, Ls.8-16.) Mr. Torson failed the field
sobriety tests. (R., p.73.) Subsequently, he blew .099/.098. (Tr., p.16, L.24 - p.17, L.3;
R., p.73.)
The State charged Mr. Torson with DUI and alleged he had a prior felony DUI conviction
within fifteen years. (R., pp.24-25.) Mr. Torson moved to suppress the sobriety tests and breath
results, asserting that Officer Aja impermissibly extended the traffic stop by not serving the
citations and completing the mission of the stop and staring a DUI investigation instead without
reasonable suspicion to justify doing so. (R., pp.38-42.) The district court denied that motion,
concluding that the combination of Officer Aja observing Mr. Torson’s nervousness in addition
to hearing Officer Shackelford’s comments about Mr. Torson’s eyes gave Officer Aja reasonable
suspicion to start the DUI investigation. (R., pp.74-75.) Additionally, it concluded that, based
on Mr. Torson’s answers to Officer Aja’s initial questions in that regard, as well as the detected
odor of alcoholic beverages, the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety
tests. (R., pp.75-76.)
Mr. Torson subsequently entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal
the decision to deny his motion to suppress. (See, e.g., Tr., p.45, Ls.19-22.) The district court
ultimately imposed and executed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, to be
served concurrent to another new sentence. (Tr., p.65, Ls.13-23.) Mr. Torson filed a notice of
appeal timely from the resulting judgment of conviction. (R., pp.92, 97.)

4

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Torson’s motion to suppress.

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Torson’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate courts use a bifurcated

standard of review. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607 (2016). The appellate court will defer to
the district court’s findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but it will review
the application of legal principles to those facts de novo. Id.

B.

Officer Aja Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Justify Abandoning The Mission Of
The Traffic Stop To Start A DUI Investigation
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 524 (1986).
Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608.
Such seizures are only reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “so long as the seizing officer
had reasonable suspicion that a [traffic] violation had occurred.” Id. That also means “the
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.” Rodriguez v. United States,
575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). In other words, “[b]ecause addressing the infraction is the purpose of
the stop, it may last no longer than necessary to effectuate that purpose,” and “[a]uthority for the
seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Id. (internal quotation and alterations omitted).

6

As a result, “unless some new reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises to justify the
seizure’s new purpose, a seized party’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the original
purpose of the stop is abandoned.” Linze, 161 Idaho at 609. This rule prevents temporarily
abandoning the mission of the stop as much as completely abandoning it. See id. For example,
“The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a
ticket . . . but whether conducing the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop.’”
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357. Any period of detention not justified by reasonable suspicion
constitutes a violation; there is no de minimus exception in this regard. Linze, 161 Idaho at 609
n.2.
The record in this case clearly demonstrates that Officer Aja abandoned the mission of
the traffic stop by deciding not to deliver the traffic citations in order to conduct a DUI
investigation instead. (See Tr., p.23, Ls.9-24.) As such, if he did not have reasonable suspicion
to justify conducting the DUI investigation, that deviation from the mission of the traffic stop
and the resulting extension of Mr. Torson’s detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357; Linze, 161 Idaho at 609.
All Officer Aja knew at the time he decided to abandon the mission of the traffic stop
was that Mr. Torson had appeared nervous during the initial interaction with him and that he had
heard Officer Shackelford comment that Mr. Torson’s eyes were red and watery and had
constricted pupils. As the Court of Appeals has made clear, “[a] nervous demeanor during an
encounter with law enforcement is of limited significance in establishing the presence of
reasonable suspicion because it is common for people to exhibit signs of nervousness when
confronted with law enforcement regardless of criminal activity.” State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919,
924 (Ct. App. 2016). In Neal, the signs that the driver was extraordinarily nervous were that his

7

leg was bouncing, he had difficulty standing still, and his speech was rapid. Id. The Court of
Appeals held that those factors, either separately or together, did not establish reasonable
suspicion, especially when the video contradicted those assertions. Id.
In Mr. Torson’s case, unlike in Neal, the officer did not even articulate any particular
behaviors that might demonstrate Mr. Torson was extraordinarily nervous. (See generally Tr.)
In fact, the officer admitted he affirmatively did not observe any of the behaviors traditionally
associated with extreme nervousness, as he admitted Mr. Torson was not sweating, he was not
making any fidgety or furtive movements, such as a bouncing leg, and he was not speaking
rapidly. (Tr., p.18, Ls.19-20, p.18, L.24 – p.19, L.1, p.19, Ls.11-21.) The video does not show
Mr. Torson engaging in any nervous behaviors either. (See generally State’s Exhibit 1 (Aja
video).) As such, there were even less articulable signs of nervousness in Mr. Torson’s case than
there were in Neal, and so, the alleged excessive nervousness (if there was such nervousness at
all) was of even less value in establishing reasonable suspicion in Mr. Torson’s case than it was
in Neal.
The only other factor of which Officer Aja was aware, according to the district court,
when he abandoned the mission of the traffic stop was that Officer Shackelford had asked
Mr. Torson why his eyes appeared red and watery and his pupils were constricted. (R., p.73 &
n.4; compare Tr., p.12, Ls.13-16. (Officer Aja only testifying he took notice of Officer
Shackelford’s comment about Mr. Torson’s pupils).)

Those facts do not, by themselves,

establish reasonable suspicion of drug use. See State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 616
(Ct. App. 2014) (explaining that “few additional facts are needed beyond bloodshot and glassy
eyes to provide reasonable suspicion of impaired driving or illegal drug activity,” thereby
indicating that some additional fact or facts beyond the condition of the driver’s eyes is needed

8

for there to be reasonable suspicion); see also State v. Hogan, 868 N.W.2d 124, 132-33
(Wisc. 2015) (actually holding observed nervousness and constricted pupils was not sufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion).
In Perez-Jungo, the fact which the officer knew beyond the fact that the driver’s eyes
were bloodshot and glassy was that the driver had given an unreasonable explanation for being
parked on a gravel road in a remote area late at night. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 616. Similarly,
in State v. Grigg, the officer noticed that, in addition to bloodshot and glassy eyes, the driver also
had reddened conjunctiva and his eyelids were tremoring. Id. (citing State v. Grigg, 149 Idaho
361, 364 (Ct. App. 2010)). Mr. Torson’s case is a far cry from Grigg and Perez-Jungo, as
Officer Aja had no indication Mr. Torson’s eyes were either bloodshot or glassy; all he heard
was that Officer Shackelford thought they looked red and watery, with constricted pupils. As
such, more additional factors were needed to create reasonable suspicion in his case than in
either Perez-Jungo or Grigg. And, as noted supra, the only additional factor in this case was
generalized nervousness, which is nowhere near the specific additional factors that gave rise to
reasonable suspicion in Perez-Jungo and Grigg.
Rather, Mr. Torson’s case is more akin to Hogan. In Hogan, as here, the State attempted
to justify an extension of the traffic stop based only on the driver’s unusual nervousness and
constricted pupils. Id. at 132. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s decision that those two factors did not give rise to reasonable suspicion because the
officer in that case had admitted that pupil constriction could be related to various other factors
besides drug use and the officer was not a drug recognition expert.7 Id. at 132-33. Here, as in

7

The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that its decision in this case was based on the State
failing to carry its burden to justify the detention in that particular case, leaving open the
9

Hogan, Officer Aja did not claim to be a drug recognition expert. (See Tr., p.6, Ls.18-22
(testifying only that he has experience recognizing signs of drug use).)8 Therefore, as in Hogan,
the fact that Officer Aja heard Officer Shackelford comment on the condition of Mr. Torson’s
pupils was not enough to create a reasonable suspicion of drug use because that fact could have
been attributable to innocent explanations, much like the alleged redness and wateriness could be
attributed to Mr. Torson’s grief at the recent death of his mother. As a result, the condition of
Mr. Torson’s eyes was, like his alleged nervousness, of limited value in establishing reasonable
suspicion.
Since neither Mr. Torson’s alleged nervousness or Officer Shackelford’s comment about
his eyes alone would give rise to reasonable suspicion, the only remaining consideration is
whether, the combination of those otherwise-innocent facts still might give rise to reasonable
suspicion. See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 424 (Ct. App. 2015). In Kelley, the known
facts were that the traffic stop occurred just after midnight, the driver provided a driver’s license
and registration with a third party’s name and no proof of insurance, volunteered various
information including some which the officer knew to be false, and had bloodshot eyes. Id. at
424-25. The combination of all those potentially-innocent facts gave rise to reasonable suspicion
to extend the stop for a drug investigation. Id. However, combinations of otherwise-innocent
facts will not always give rise to reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Neal, 159 Idaho at 925. In
Neal, the driver’s nervousness, his drug-affiliated attire, and his refusal to consent to a search of

possibility that it could justify an extension based on those factors in another case. Hogan, 868
N.W.2d at 132.
8
While it does not appear the district court considered the transcript of the preliminary hearing in
ruling on the motion to suppress (see R., p.71 and n.1; compare Tr., p.34, Ls.4-6 (defense
counsel encouraging the district court to consider “what’s in the preliminary transcript that the
Court has”)), at the preliminary hearing, Officer Aja specifically testified he was not a drug
recognition expert. (Prelim. Tr., p.17, Ls.23-24.)
10

the car at 12:30 in the morning “bears more than little significance in a reasonable suspicion
analysis. Taken together, they still do not support a reasonable suspicion, even considering the
officer’s experience” because of that limited probative value each individual fact contributed. Id.
Mr. Torson’s case is more like Neal than Kelley. There were even fewer independentlyinnocent factors than in Neal which might contribute to reasonable suspicion. They were also
minimally relevant at best to that analysis. Compare Kelley, 159 Idaho at 425 (considering,
critically, the fact that the defendant volunteered information which the officer knew to be false
in the equation). At best, as in Neal, the two factors known in Mr. Torson’s case gave rise to a
hunch, “but a hunch is not sufficient to meet the stringent requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.” Id. Therefore, the period of time where Officer Aja abandoned the mission of the
traffic stop to begin a drug investigation was unconstitutional and any resulting evidence should
be suppressed. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Linze, 161 Idaho at
609.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Torson respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and reverse the order
denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 18th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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